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Abstract
The effect of the cause of a disaster, i.e. whether it was perceived to be caused by human or natural factors, on willingness to
donate money to disaster victims was examined. In Study 1 (N¼ 76), the cause of a fictitious disaster was experimentally varied.
In Study 2 (N¼ 219), participants were asked about their views regarding donations to two real-life disasters, one of which was
perceived to be naturally caused while the other one was perceived to be caused by humans. In Study 3 (N¼ 115), the cause of a
fictitious disaster was experimentally varied, but this time measures of the proposed psychological mediators of the effect on
donations were included, namely perceived victim blame and the extent to which victims were thought to make an effort to help
themselves. A measure of real donation behaviour was also added. In Study 4 (N¼ 196), the proposed psychological mediators
were manipulated directly, and the effect of this on donations was monitored. Across all studies, more donations were elicited by
naturally caused rather than humanly caused disasters. This difference was driven by a perception that the victims of natural
disasters are to be blamed less for their plight, and that they make more of an effort to help themselves. Implications for theory and
practice are discussed. Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Humanitarian disasters are all too frequent, and the material
and human costs of such events are enormous (Swiss Re,
2005). Many people donate to disaster relief appeals (Wrathall
& Ellis, 2006). Such appeals are so plentiful that donors have a
number of different causes to choose from at any given
moment in time. An intriguing question is how donors decide
which cause to choose. There are large variations in donations
following real-life disasters (see, e.g. the United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2007).
For example, individual giving after the Asian Tsunami
of 2004 was impressive, but other crises of similar impact, e.g.
the large-scale humanitarian crisis in Darfur, are less popular
(Baker, 2005). There are over a billion of extremely poor
people in extremely poor countries worldwide (Collier, 2008).
Often, it is the poorest people who suffer from humanitarian
disasters, as in the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, and the cyclone
in Burma in 2009. The question of what motivates inhabitants
of rich nations to help such desperate victims is arguably one of
the most important questions to be tackled today.
The aim of the present research was to study the factors that
lead individuals to decide to donate to a certain cause, and—
through this—to explain why some relief appeals are so much
more successful than others. In particular, disasters perceived
to be causedmainly by natural factors such as floods or drought
were compared to disasters perceived to be caused mainly by
human factors such as war and corruption. The psychological
mechanisms which might mediate the effects of the perceived
cause of a disaster on willingness to donate to its victims
were tested.
Donations have been studied from both a psychological
perspective (e.g. Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz, & Darley, 2002;
Holmes, Miller, & Lerner, 2002; Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg,
& Pyszczynski, 2002; Levy, Freitas, & Salovey, 2002) and
from other angles. Notably, many contributions—(but not all,
see e.g. Kogut & Ritov, 2007; Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic,
2006)—have not discussed the psychological mechanisms
which lead to or prevent a donation. For example, Sargeant and
Lee (2004) analysed perceptions of individual charities,
explaining why people donate to one organisation rather than
another. Others have studied different advertising methods
such as the use of pictures, accounting for between-campaign
variations in donations (Perrine & Heather, 2000). The effects
of individual difference variables such as demographic and
financial characteristics of the donor (Wunderink, 2002) and of
situational variables such as mortality salience (Ferraro, Shiv,
& Bettman, 2005) have also been highlighted. Simon (1997)
investigated private donations following earthquakes and
found that the extent of media coverage for different causes
and the severity of a disaster influenced donations. However,
none of this research has investigated potential effects of the
perceived cause of a disaster. Yet, reasons why negative
events took place are often heavily discussed in the media.
It is therefore entirely possible that the perceived causes of
disaster events might shape people’s reactions to them, and a
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systematic account of just how this might happen seems long
overdue.
There is a large psychological literature on pro-social
behaviour (e.g. Batson, 1998; Deaux, Dane, & Wrightsman,
1993; Dovidio & Penner, 2004; Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder,
& Penner, 2006; Penner, Dovidio, & Piliavin, 2005; Simmons,
1991). Although much of this work has focussed on types of
helping other than monetary donations, this literature might
nonetheless provide some useful pointers for explaining the
effects of the cause of a disaster on psychological reactions to
it. This literature has linked a number of variables to helping
behaviour, for example empathy with the victim (e.g. Batson,
1997; Batson, Lishner, Cook, & Sawyer, 2005; Batson, Sager,
Garst, Kang, Rubchinsky, & Dawson, 1997; see also Piferi,
Jobe, & Jones, 2006). It has also been demonstrated that
group memberships influence helping (Gaertner & Brickman,
1971; Gaertner, Dovidio, & Johnson, 1982; Saucier, Miller,
& Doucet, 2005). There is now renewed awareness that
group processes cannot be ignored in the study of prosocial
behaviour (Cuddy, Rock & Norton, 2007; Graziano, Habashi,
Sheese, & Tobin, 2007; Jonas et al., 2002; Nadler, 2002;
Simon, Stu¨rmer, & Steffens, 2000; Stu¨rmer, Snyder, & Omoto,
2005), and several recent works have demonstrated that
people are more willing to help ingroup members than
outgroup members (Dovidio, Piliavin, Gaertner, Schroeder, &
Clark, 1991; Dovidio, Gaertner, Validzic, Matoka, Johnson, &
Frazier, 1997; Hornstein, 1978; Levine, Cassidy, Brazier,
& Reicher, 2002; Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005;
Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). However,
most of this research has investigated help for an individual
while that individual’s ingroup or outgroup membership was
salient. The present research instead focuses on help for large
groups per se, i.e. donations to a victim group where it is
unclear which individual will benefit from the monetary
donation. To our knowledge, only one previous study has
investigated such group-level helping. Van Leeuven (2007)
studied the responses of Dutch participants to the Asian Tsunami
of 2004, and found that the willingness to help outgroups
depends on whether the ingroup is perceived to be under threat.
Although this study investigated group-level helping, its focus
was not the effect of perceived causes of a disaster. There is a
clear gap in the literature when it comes to that question.
Natural Versus Humanly Caused Disasters
One dimension on which the perceived cause of a disaster
might vary is the extent to which it is attributed to natural or
humanly caused factors. For example, while the Tsunami was
widely perceived to have been caused by natural factors, the
Darfur crisis can be described as caused by humans. Of course,
the distinction between naturally and humanly caused disasters
is not always clear-cut. For instance, a tidal wave might be
caused ‘naturally’ on the surface, but in fact human factors
might have contributed (e.g. climate change impacted by
human behaviour). However, one type of cause will often
dominate over the other in people’s perceptions of events.
People can think of events as being more or less caused by
natural or humanly caused factors; and it is hypothesized that
the dominant perception of an event will shape reactions to it.
It is proposed that the cause of a disaster might influence
the degree to which the victims are blamed for their plight, and
the degree to which they are perceived to make an effort to
help themselves. Victim blame and self-help, in turn, are
hypothesized to affect willingness to donate.
Attributions of Victim Blame
From other prosocial contexts, there exists evidence that
people are more likely to help innocent victims than those
victims that are blamed for their misfortune (Betancourt, 1990;
Campbell, Carr, &MacLachlan, 2001; Jackson & Esses, 1997;
Piliavin, Rodin, & Piliavin, 1969; Stroebe & Stroebe, 1996;
Weiner, 1993). Attributions have also been linked specifically
to willingness to donate (Campbell et al., 2001; Cheung &
Chan, 2000). It is therefore reasonable to predict that victim
blame would reduce donation proclivity. Why, however, might
the extent of victim blame be dependent upon the perceived
cause of a disaster?
According to the Just World Belief hypothesis (Lerner,
1980), people have an inherent need to believe that the world is
just. The suffering of innocents calls into question this just
world belief. In order to protect it, people try to construe
suffering as just whenever possible, for example by inferring
that victims must be blameworthy (Betancourt, 1990; Hafner,
2000). Following from this, it can be proposed that people
tend to blame victims of humanitarian disasters when given a
chance to do so. Further, humanly caused disasters generally
offer more opportunity to blame the victims than naturally
caused disasters. For example, it is unlikely that victims of
natural disasters could have caused a tsunami, earthquake or
hurricane. However, it is often possible that the victims of
humanly caused disasters might have contributed to a crisis.
For example, they might have caused a famine by overusing
the land, they might have caused a civil war by engaging in
armed conflict, or they might have caused political instability
by electing an incompetent government.
Although of course there are many humanly caused
disasters in which the victims did not objectively play any
causal role, on the basis of the Just World Belief hypothesis we
would expect that potential donors have a tendency to blame
the victims even when the available evidence is ambiguous, or
when no evidence about the role of the victims is present. This
is because potential donors are motivated to blame the victims
when given the slightest chance, in order to defend their
belief of the world as just. Our definition of humanly caused
disasters therefore captures both disasters in which the victims
themselves have played a causal role and disasters in which
humans other than the victims have played a causal role: In
both these types of events, the potential for victim blame is
hypothesised to be larger than in naturally caused events.
Attributions of Self-Help
We further hypothesise that victim blame has a powerful effect
on how victims are perceived along other dimensions, so that
someone who is blamed is also perceived more negatively in
other respects. Such an associative valence transfer has been
demonstrated in the seminal work on the halo effect in person
perception (Asch, 1946). Similar transfer effects, whereby one
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feature has an influence on how a person is judged on other
dimensions, might be expected in the present context: If
victims are blamed more, they might also be perceived as less
likeable and more lazy, and therefore as less willing to make a
proactive effort to help themselves.
We were particularly interested in transfer effects to the
dimension ‘perceived self-help’, for two reasons. Although
it was shown that a perception that victims are undertaking
positive steps to improve their situation increases willingness
to help in one early study focusing on helping other
than donations (Stroebe & Stroebe, 1996), self-help has not
received any attention since then. Given the encouraging
findings in this early study, we felt that this concept is certainly
due for re-visitation, and that it could reasonably be expected
to be important also in the specific helping context of interest
here, namely help for large groups in great need. Furthermore,
self-help is a particularly interesting concept in the context of
humanitarian disasters, because many donation appeals tend to
picture victims as rather passive (e.g. pictures of people sitting
down and staring into space), presumably in an attempt to
underscore their neediness. Although one might expect that
victim blame might also cause transfer effects on dimensions
other than self-help, we were particularly interested in self-
help because its lack is so often invoked in donation appeals,
and because one early study on helping underscored the
potential importance of this concept.
Taken together, it was proposed that people are more
willing to donate to victims of natural rather than humanly
caused disasters, and that this difference would at least partly
be due to different levels of victim blame and resulting levels
of perceived self-help in the two types of situation. It was
theorized that victim blame would be higher for human causes
(because donors would seek to blame the victims whenever
given a chance to do so, and because humanly caused events
provide more opportunity for victim blame). It was further
theorized that perceived self-help would be lower for human
causes (because blaming victims for their plight would lead to
them being perceived more negatively along other dimensions
too). Finally, it was assumed that victim blame would have a
negative impact on willingness to donate, and that a perception
that victims are making an effort to help themselves would
have a positive impact on willingness to donate.
In formulating these hypotheses, we do not intend to argue
that transfer effects from victim blame might not occur on
dimensions other than self-help, or that the effects of the
perceived cause of a disaster on donations might not also be
mediated by factors other than the ones studied here. For
example, one could also reasonably assume that different types
of disasters might be associated with different levels of
perceived stress in the victims and a differential perception of
their ability to cope, which then might impact on donation
decisions. However, for the reasons outlined above, we felt that
the focus on victim blame and self-help presents a good
starting point in this initial exploration of helping in disaster
settings.
There are several reasons why investigating these
hypotheses presents a novel theoretical innovation. Firstly,
as outlined above, much work on donations has been very
applied in focus, and has not investigated psychological
processes which mediate between characteristics of a disaster
situation and eventual donation behaviour. Secondly, to our
knowledge no work has investigated potential effects of
the perceived cause of a disaster, and only one study has
highlighted the potential role of perceived self-help. Thirdly,
this contribution will help to extend the research from types of
helping traditionally studied to a novel type of helping, namely
help for large groups in great need. This type of help has to date
received very little attention from psychologists, and we know
very little about what causes people to treat different victim
groups differently.
The hypotheses were tested in four studies. Study 1
compared responses to a fictitious disaster event which was
described as having natural causes in one condition and
human causes in the other. Study 2 compared responses to
two real-life disasters, the Asian Tsunami of 2004 (widely
discussed in the media as having a natural cause) and the
humanitarian crisis in Darfur (widely discussed to be humanly
caused). Study 3 again manipulated the perceived cause of a
disaster focusing on another fictitious event, but including a
measure of the proposed mediators and of actual donations in
addition to self-reports. Finally, Study 4 directly manipulated
perceived victim blame and self-help, to monitor the effect on
willingness to donate.
STUDY 1
This study was designed to test whether disasters which
are perceived to have natural causes would trigger more
willingness to donate than disasters which are perceived to
have human causes. The study focused on a fictitious disaster,
varying ‘disaster cause’ experimentally.
Method
Pilot Test for Study 1
A fake article was designed about a fictitious humanitarian
disaster which had occurred on a tropical island. It was stated
that a storm had swept across the island, causing flooding
and destroying buildings, crop and livestock. The dams that
had been in place were too weak to fend off the forceful gales,
and it was claimed that the islanders were now reliant on
help in order to prevent a catastrophic famine. ‘Cause’ was
manipulated through differential information about the reason
the dams gave way. In the ‘natural’ condition, the dams were
well-built and gave way because the storm was much stronger
than is usual in this part of the world. In the ‘humanly caused’
condition, the dams were not well-built and gave way because
government officials had stolen some of the funds designated
to building the dams. Hence, in both conditions the impending
disaster—i.e. the proximal cause—was a famine, but the
distant cause, i.e. the cause of the famine, differed between
experimental conditions (Brickman, Ryan, &Wortman, 1975).
The pilot study tested whether this manipulation had
the desired effect on perceived cause. This was tested in a
pilot, rather than the main study, because of concerns that
otherwise participants would have realized the purpose of the
manipulation, which would of course have rendered the
interpretation of their responses problematic. Seventy-seven
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psychology undergraduate participants (18 male, 59 female,
mean age 21) were randomly presented with one of the two
fake articles. They were then asked to indicate to which extent
they thought the disaster was caused by humans (1¼ not at all
to 7¼ very much), and to which extent they thought the
disaster was caused by natural factors (1¼ not at all to 7¼ very
much). The order in which the two items appeared was
randomized. Upon completion of the study, participants were
thoroughly debriefed.
When conducting a mixed ANOVA with the experimental
factor as the between participants factor with two levels and
the two attribution items as two levels of a repeated measures
factor, as expected, the interaction was highly significant, F (1,
75)¼ 37.76, p< .001. Pairwise comparisons revealed that
attributions to natural causes were significantly stronger in the
‘natural cause’ condition than in the ‘human cause’ condition,
Ms¼ 6.20, 5.11, F (1, 75)¼ 31.89, p¼ .001. Further, attribu-
tions to human causes were significantly stronger in the
‘human cause’ condition than in the ‘natural cause’ condition,
Ms¼ 4.75, 2.70, F (1, 75)¼ 17.54, p¼ .001. Hence, there was
clear evidence that the manipulation had the desired effect.
Main Study 1
Participants Seventy-six participants volunteered to com-
plete a study during university open days. Participants were
relations of prospective students. The mean age was 49.57 years
(ranging from 32 to 79). There were 33 males, and 43 females.
Design
The study had one independent factor (cause) with two levels,
‘humanly caused’ and ‘natural’. Participants were randomly
assigned to conditions.
Procedure and Measures
Participants were randomly presented with one of the two fake
articles described above. After reading the scenarios,
participants responded to the item ‘I would be willing to give
donations to the victims’ (1¼ disagree strongly to 7¼ agree
strongly). Upon completion of the study, participants were
thoroughly debriefed.
Results
An ANOVA was conducted to test whether the independent
variable (IV) ‘cause’ affected willingness to donate. As
expected, willingness to donate was higher in the ‘natural’ than
in the ‘humanly caused’ condition, Ms¼ 5.31, 4.55, F (1,
74)¼ 4.89, p< .03, MSE¼ 2.21, providing evidence for the
hypothesis that people are more willing to donate to victims of
natural rather than humanly caused disasters.
Discussion
Study 1 suggests that people are more inclined to donate
to victims of naturally caused rather than humanly caused
disasters. However, this study does not address the mechan-
isms by which the cause of a disaster might impact on
willingness to donate to disaster victims, as it did not
include measures of the proposed mediators ‘victim blame’
and perceived ‘self-help’. Study 2 addressed this issue. Study 2
focused on two real-life events, to increase the ecological




Two hundred nineteen British students participated in
exchange for course credits. The mean age was 20.32 years.
There were 38 male and 181 female participants.
Design
All participants filled out a questionnaire in 2005. There
were two versions of the questionnaire, one about the
‘Tsunami’ disaster, and one about the ‘Darfur’ disaster. Both
events featured in the media at the time the study was
conducted. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions
(N¼ 111 for ‘Tsunami’, and N¼ 108 for ‘Darfur’). Hence,
‘disaster type’ was a between participants factor with two
levels.
Procedure and Measures
For participants in the ‘Tsunami’ condition, items were
preceded by the following text: ‘Thousands of people died
when the big tidal wave hit the coast of several Asian countries
last year, and many more had their livelihoods destroyed. They
depended on outside help to survive and rebuild their lives’.
For participants in the ‘Darfur’ condition, items were preceded
by the following text: ‘Thousands of people died in Sudan’s
province of Darfur at the hand of a rival ethnic group, and
many more had to flee to save their lives. Those refugees were
dependent on outside help to survive and rebuild their lives.’
Then, several items were presented asking the participants
about their perceptions of the event, and their inclination to
donate money to the victims.
Participants were asked to indicate what they perceived to
be the cause of the disaster, by choosing whether they thought
that the event was mainly naturally caused or mainly humanly
caused (forced-choice response format).
Victim blame was measured with four items which assessed
whether victims were perceived to be responsible for their
plight (1¼ disagree strongly to 7¼ agree strongly): ‘I believe
that the victims were clearly blameless, they did not do
anything to bring the disaster on themselves’ (reverse scored);
‘I think the victims of the disaster might have been responsible
for their plight themselves at least to some extent’; ‘I think the
victims of the disaster brought the disaster on themselves by
their prior behaviour’; and ‘I believe the victims of the disaster
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did not do anything wrong themselves’ (reverse scored);
a¼ .90.
Self-help by the victims was measured with four items
(1¼ disagree strongly to 7¼ agree strongly): ‘I believe that the
victims did everything humanly possible to improve their
situation as best as they could’; ‘I believe the victims tried
to ‘help themselves’ as best as they could’; ‘I believe that
the victims just waited for others to come and help’ (reverse
scored); and ‘I believe that the victims were pretty passive and
did not try to help themselves’ (reverse scored); a¼ .85.
A five item scale measured participants’ willingness to
donate money to the victims (1¼ not at all to 7¼ very much):
‘I would be willing to give donations to the victims of
the disaster’; ‘I think it is important to give donations to the
victims’; ‘I think it is the right thing to do to give donations to
the victims’; ‘I think everyone should donate money to the
victims’; and ‘I would give the maximum amount I could
afford according to my means to the victims’; a¼ .82.
The questionnaire also included some questions about
demographic information and some items which are not of
relevance in the present context. Upon completion of the study,
participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results
Manipulation Check
Chi-square (x2) analysis revealed that, as expected, the
majority of those participants in the Tsunami condition
indicated that they thought the disaster was naturally caused
(103 indicated natural causes versus 6 who indicated
human causes), and the majority of participants in the Darfur
condition indicated that they thought the disaster was humanly
caused (105 indicated human causes versus 2 who indicated
natural causes), x2 (1)¼ 185.44, p< .001.
Relationships Between Variables
A structural equation model (SEM) was specified whereby
disaster type (Tsunami versus Darfur, scored 0 versus 1)
predicted perceived disaster cause (natural versus human,
scored 0 versus 1), which in turn predicted perceived ‘victim
blame’, which then predicted perceived ‘self-help’, which then
predicted ‘willingness to donate’. Bivariate correlations are
displayed in Table 1.
The model fitted the data well. Although the Chi-square
was significant, the arguably more important fit indices
demonstrated a good fit, x2 (6)¼ 20.55, p< .01; CFI¼ .98;
GFI¼ .96; SRMR¼ .07. It accounted for 13% of the variance
in willingness to donate. As can be seen in Figure 1, all the
individual paths were significant and in the hypothesised
direction. Importantly, there were three significant indirect
effects on willingness to donate, z¼"4.55, p< .001 for
‘disaster type’, z¼"4.59, p< .001 for ‘disaster cause’, and
z¼"5.05, p< .001 for ‘victim blame’.
An alternative model was tested, to yield better support for
the predicted causal direction of effects. This alternative model
was identical to the one described above, with the exception
that the paths from ‘willingness to donate’ to ‘self-help’, the
path from ‘self-help’ to ‘victim blame’, and the path
from ‘victim blame’ to ‘disaster cause’ were reversed, testing
effectively the opposite causal direction to the one proposed by
the hypotheses. It is not entirely inconceivable that partici-
pants, anticipating that they wish to donate to someone, would
consequentially start to think more positive about the potential
recipients, in order to avoid cognitive dissonance (Festinger,
1957). It is also not impossible transfer effects might exist from
self-help to victim blame, that donors’ thoughts about the
victims would influence the perceived cause of the disaster.
This alternativemodel did not fit the data well, x2 (6)¼ 113.63,
p< .001; CFI¼ .83; GFI¼ .85; SRMR¼ .27, yielding further
support for the hypotheses.
Discussion
Study 2 again demonstrated that participants were more
willing to donate to a disaster which was perceived to be
caused naturally than to a disaster which was perceived to
be caused by human factors. This time, the proposed mediators
victim blame and self-help were measured, and found to be
effective. One problemwith correlational data is that the causal
direction of observed associations cannot be determined with
as great a certainty as is possible with experimental design.
Further, although the focus on real-life disasters adds an aspect
of ecological validity, greater control over extraneous variables
could be achieved by using instead fictitious disasters. Hence, a
third study was conducted. The aim was to yield experimental
evidence for the proposed mechanisms. Another objective of
Study 3 was to also include a behavioural measure of donations
in addition to the self-report measure. Although we expected
that self-reported willingness to donate would give a good
indication of behavioural donation inclinations, we wanted to








Victim blame 0.59### "0.59###
Willingness to donate "0.22### 0.35### "0.37###
Note: # p< .05; ## p< .01; ###p< .001.
Figure 1. ‘Victim blame’ and ‘self-help’ mediate the effect of ‘cause of disaster’ on ‘donations’, Study 2. Note: ### p< .001; ## p< .01;
# p< .05
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confirm this by adding a behavioural measure. In Study 3,
participants were given the option of donating actual money,
and the effect of the experimental manipulation on donation
behaviour was examined.
STUDY 3
Like Study 1, this study tested participants’ reactions to a
fictitious disaster and varied the cause of the disaster
experimentally. However, measures of the perceived mediators
‘victim blame’ and ‘self-help’ were included as in Study 2.
Further, Study 3 included a behavioural measure: Participants
were given the opportunity to donate real money. Because
few of the works on prosocial behaviour have gone beyond
self-report measures, this presents an important innovation.
The ‘cause’ of the disaster (natural versus humanly caused)
was manipulated, and the effect of this on donations, victim
blame and perceived self-help was measured. It was expected
that natural disasters would trigger more donations than
humanly caused disasters and that this effect would be caused
by differences in perceived victim blame and self-help.
Method
Pilot Test for Study 3
A pilot test first tested whether the experimental material
was effective in manipulating the perceived cause of a
disaster (natural versus human). All participants read a fake
article summarizing the fictitious annual report of a major
international charity. The report highlighted particularly the
suffering caused by famine. Participants were told that as many
as 33% of people are under-nourished, that the proportion rises
to 57% in some of the worst affected regions, and that millions
of people are starving. Then, they were told that the vast
majority of famines can be explained by [natural drought/
armed conflict], and that [the extremely dry weather
conditions/the multitude of current regional conflicts and
civil wars] this year were cited as the major cause of the food
shortages. The article concluded with a citation from a
relief coordinator, urging people to donate money. Hence, the
disaster in both experimental conditions was a famine disaster.
However, the conditions differed with regards to what caused
the famine (natural or humanly caused factors).
Eighty-one psychology undergraduate participants (18
male, 59 female, 4 missing values, mean age 21) were
randomly presented with one of the two fake articles. They
were then asked to indicate to which extent they thought the
famine was caused by humans (1¼ not at all to 7¼ very
much), and towhich extent they thought the faminewas caused
by natural factors (1¼ not at all to 7¼ very much). The
order in which the two items appeared was randomized.
Upon completion of the study, participants were thoroughly
debriefed. As for the pilot study for Study 1, this measure was
assessed in a pilot study rather than the main study in order to
reduce demand characteristics.
When conducting a mixed ANOVA with the experimental
factor as a between participants factor with two levels and the
two attribution items as two levels of a repeated measures
factor, as expected, the interaction was highly significant,
F (1, 78)¼ 36.41, p< .001. Pairwise comparisons revealed
that attributions to natural causes were significantly stronger
in the ‘natural cause’ condition than in the ‘human cause’
condition, Ms¼ 5.52, 4.23, F (1, 78)¼ 19.25, p¼ .001.
Further, attributions to human causes were significantly
stronger in the ‘human cause’ condition than in the ‘natural
cause’ condition,Ms¼ 5.25, 3.62, F (1, 78)¼ 28.05, p¼ .001.
Hence, there was clear evidence that the manipulation had the
desired effect.
Main Study 3
Participants One hundred and fifteen British students
participated in the study. The mean age was 19.04 years. There
were 17 male participants, and 98 females.
Design
The study had one independent factor (‘cause’) with two
levels: ‘Humanly caused’ versus ‘natural’. Participants were
randomly assigned to conditions.
Procedure and Measures
After reading the article described above, participants
answered a short questionnaire. All items were measured on
7-point scales (1¼ not at all/disagree strongly to 7¼ very
much/agree strongly).
‘Victim blame’ was measured with four items: ‘I think the
victims brought the famine on themselves through their prior
behaviour’; ‘I believe the victims did not do anything which
could have triggered the disaster’ (reverse coded); ‘I think the
victims can be blamed for the situation they are in’; and ‘I think
the victims have played an important role in causing the
disaster’; a¼ .75.
‘Self-help’ was measured with three items: ‘I believe the
victims are not making much effort to help themselves’;
‘I believe the victims are not trying very hard to improve their
situation’ (both reverse coded); and ‘I believe the victims are
working hard to relieve themselves from the disaster’; a¼ .81.
Willingness to donate was measured with four items:
‘I would be willing to give donations to the victims of the
disaster’; ‘I think it is important to give donations to the
victims’; ‘I think it is the right thing to do to give donations to
the victims’; ‘I think everyone should donate money to the
victims’; a¼ .80.
To measure actual donations, participants received £3 in
the form of six 50 pence coins, allegedly to compensate them
for their time. An envelope containing this payment was
stapled to the back of the questionnaire. There was a further
envelope entitled ‘donations’. Participants read that they could
donate some, none, or all of their payment to the famine
victims they had read about by putting the appropriate amount
into the second envelope. We counted the number of coins
participants donated, which yielded a 7-point scale (0¼ no 50p
coin donated to 6¼ all coins donated). This method to measure
actual donations has been successfully used before (e.g. Levy,
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West, Ramirez, & Karafantis, 2006). None of the participants
reported having been suspicious during the debrief.
A number of additional measures which are not of interest
in the present context were also included in the questionnaire.
Upon completion of the study, participants were thoroughly
debriefed. All donations participants had made were sub-




On average, participants donated 4.09 coins (i.e. just over
£2 on the scale from £0 to £3). Fifteen participants donated
nothing; all others donated at least one coin.
Mediation by ‘Victim Blame’ and ‘Self-Help’
To test whether the effect of ‘cause’ on donations was
indeed mediated by ‘victim blame’ and perceived ‘self-help’, a
structural equation model was built. Self-reported ‘willingness
to donate’ and ‘actual donations’ were specified to load on a
factor called ‘donations’. The path from the factor to ‘actual
donations’ was fixed to one. ‘Cause’ was specified to predict
‘victim blame’, which in turn was expected to impact on
‘self-help’, which in turn was specified to influence the latent
factor ‘donations’.
The model fitted the data well, x2 (5)¼ 3.72, ns;
CFI¼ 1.00; GFI¼ .99; SRMR¼ .05. It accounted for 19%
of the variance in ‘willingness to donate’, and for 36% of the
variance in actual donations. As can be seen in Figure 2, all
the individual paths were significant and in the hypothesised
direction. What is more, ‘cause’ had a significant indirect
effect on ‘donations’, z¼ 2.41, p< .05, as did ‘victim blame’,
z¼"2.89, p< .01. Note further that the Lagrange Multiplier
Test indicated that the model could not be significantly
improved by adding any direct paths, arguing for complete
rather than partial mediation.1
An alternative model was tested, to yield further support
for the predicted direction of this mediation effect. This
alternative model was identical to the one described above,
with the exception that the path from ‘self-help’ to the
‘donations’ factor was reversed, as well as the path from
‘victim blame’ to ‘self-help’. As an alternative hypothesis, it is
not entirely implausible that impressions of the victims might
be adjusted as a post hoc justification for why participants
wanted to donate (or not), and that there are transfer effects
from self-help to victim blame rather than vice versa. This
model fitted the data considerably less well, x2 (5)¼ 10.48,
p< .05; CFI¼ .92; GFI¼ .96; SRMR¼ .11, yielding further
support for our hypotheses.
Discussion
Study 3 yielded clear experimental evidence that people are
more inclined to donate to victims of naturally caused rather
than humanly caused disasters. It also yielded evidence that
this difference can be explained by the fact that people tend to
have more negative cognitions about victims of humanly
caused disasters. Victims of humanly caused disasters tend to
be blamed for their misfortune more and they tend to be
perceived as making less of an effort to help themselves.
Study 3 extended the previous research in that it measured
actual donation behaviour, not only self-reported behavioural
intentions. However, as expected, those two DVs loaded on the
same latent factor, supporting the idea that the self-report
measures of the previous studies are a good pragmatic proxy
for actual behaviour.
STUDY 4
Although the preceding studies yielded strong evidence that
the effects of disaster cause are mediated by impressions of
the victims, an even more complete test of the proposed causal
direction of effects can be obtained by additionally directly
manipulating the proposed meditators, in order to test directly




One hundred ninety-six British students participated in the
study. The mean age was 19.92 years. There were 36 male and
160 female participants.
Figure 2. ‘Victim blame’ and ‘self-help’ mediate the effect of ‘cause of disaster’ on ‘donations’, Study 3. Note: ### p< .001; ## p< .01;
# p< .05
1When testing for mediation using Baron and Kenny’s (1986) method, similar
conclusions were reached (the same goes for Study 2). However, given that the
model comprises two different dependent variables, and two different
mediators, SEM results are presented here because they present a more
parsimonious test.
Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 41, 353–363 (2011)
Donations following natural and man-made disasters 359
Design
The study had two independent factors with two levels each,
‘victim blame’ (high versus low) and ‘self-help’ (high versus
low). Participants were randomly assigned to conditions.
Procedure and Measures
All participants read a fake article about a fictitious
humanitarian disaster in an African country. Participants
were told that several hundred villages had been destroyed
by rebel groups opposing the government, that the assault
had destroyed almost all of the villagers’ possessions, that
without outside donations the victims would soon face
disease and starvation, and that a call for donations had been
launched to assist them urgently. The article manipulated
two aspects of the situation, namely (a) whether it was
suggested that the victims might be to blame for their
situation or not, and (b) whether victims were presented to
make an effort to help themselves or not. Participants were
either told that the victims were to blame because they had
supported another militia group and because they were
involved in the civil conflict themselves, or that the victims
were not to blame because they had not supported any other
militia group and because they were clearly impartial. Further,
participants were either told that the villagers were already
trying to improve their situation by building make-shift
accommodation and by being very pro-active, or that the
victims had not yet started trying to improve their situation by
building make-shift accommodation and that they were quite
passive.
After reading the article, participants answered a short
questionnaire. They also received £3 in the form of six 50
pence coins to compensate them for their time. They were
given the option to donate none, some or all of this payment
to the victims they had read about, using the same method
as described for Study 3. Upon completion of the study,
participants were thoroughly debriefed. All donations partici-
pants had made were subsequently given to a charity which
works to help the victims of civil conflict in Africa.
All self-report measures had 7-point scales (1¼ not at
all/disagree strongly to 7¼ very much/agree strongly). Will-
ingness to donate was measured with the same four items as in
Study 3 (a¼ .78). The manipulation check for ‘victim blame’
consisted of two items: ‘I think the victims of this disaster
brought the attack on themselves through their prior
behaviour’; and ‘I believe the victims of this disaster did
not do anything which could have triggered the disaster’
(reverse scored, r¼ .63). The manipulation check for ‘self-
help’ consisted of two items: ‘I believe the victims are not
making much effort to help themselves’; and ‘I believe the
victims are not trying very hard to improve their situation’
(both reverse coded, r¼ .87). To measure actual donations, we
counted the number of 50 pence coins that were donated
(0¼ none to 6¼ all). A number of additional measures were
also included in the questionnaire, such as a 4-item measure of
howwell the victims are perceived to be coping (example item:
‘I think the victims are coping quite well psychologically
speaking’, a¼ .81).
Results
Manipulation Check and Descriptives
A MANOVA was conducted with the experimental victim
blame and self-help factors as IVs, and the manipulation
check measures for victim blame and self-help as DVs. As
expected, the IV victim blame had a significant effect on the
victim blame manipulation check, F (1, 190)¼ 101.28,
p< .001. Victim blame was higher in the ‘victim blame high’
condition than in the ‘victim blame low’ condition,Ms¼ 3.95;
2.18. The IV self-help had a significant effect on the self-
help manipulation check, F (1, 190)¼ 104.35, p< .001. Self-
help was higher in the ‘self-help high’ condition than in
the ‘self-help low’ condition, Ms¼ 5.68; 3.50, showing the
effectiveness of the manipulation. On average, participants
donated 3.13 coins (i.e. just over £1.50 on the scale from £0 to
£3). Forty-six participants donated nothing; all others donated
at least one coin.
Effects of Victim Blame and Self-Help on Donations
A MANOVAwas conducted to test whether the factors victim
blame and self-help (entered into the analysis as IVs) would
exert the predicted effects on self-reported willingness to
donate and actual donations (entered as DVs). The measure of
how well victims were perceived to be coping with the
situation was entered as a covariate, to control for this factor.
Victim blame had a multivariate effect, F (2, 189)¼ 7.51,
p< .001, as did self-help, F (2, 189)¼ 3.79, p< .03. There was
no multivariate interaction.
Looking at the univariate effects, victim blame had
the predicted effect on self-reported willingness to donate,
F (1, 190)¼ 14.92, p< .001, and also on actual donations,
F (1, 190)¼ 4.31, p< .04. Self-help had the predicted effect on
willingness to donate, F (1, 190)¼ 7.62, p< .006, but the
effect on actual donations was not significant, F (1, 190)¼
1.38, ns. The two independent variables did not interact in their
effect on either of the two dependent variables. The pattern of
means is displayed in Table 2. As predicted, both self-reported
willingness to donate and actual donations were higher if
victim blame was low, and if perceived self-help was high.
Although the effect of self-help on actual donations was not
significant, the pattern of means was in the expected direction.
Discussion
Study 4 corroborated and extended the results of the previous
studies. Results clearly indicated that the way in which victims
are perceived exerts a causal effect on willingness to donate.
Study 4 again demonstrated that the hypothesised predictors
do not only impact on self-reported willingness to donate, but
that they actually impact on real behaviour. Although it should
be acknowledged that only the effect of the ‘victim blame’
and not the ‘self-help’ manipulation on ‘actual donations’
reached significance, the pattern of means was in the
hypothesised direction for both IVs. This study also showed
that although perceived qualities like victim blame and self-
help might covary in line with the halo effect in naturally
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occurring environments, it is nonetheless possible to separate
them by manipulating them independently in an experimental,
controlled setting.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Taken together, there was clear evidence that decisions of
whether or not to donate to victims of humanitarian disasters
are informed by the perceived cause of a disaster. Results
showed that donors were more reluctant to donate to victims
of humanly caused rather than natural disasters. This was to
no small extent due to the fact that donors tended to
perceive victims of humanly caused disasters as being more
blameworthy and less pro-active in helping themselves: People
form less positive impressions of victims of humanly caused
events. This amounts to a systematic bias against people
suffering from humanly caused disasters: In line with the
just world belief hypothesis, people tend to blame victims
wherever possible, and humanly caused events present more
opportunities for victim blame. More negative cognitions
about the victims on other dimensions like self-help follow
suit. People perceive victims of humanly caused events in more
negative terms even when there is no information available
about the victims’ blameworthiness or self-helping efforts.
Although victim blame might be appropriate for some
humanly caused events, and self-help might justifiably low
for some humanly caused events, this is certainly not the
case for all humanly caused disasters. Nonetheless, this is the
assumption that potential donors appear to make, and this is
what constitutes the systematic bias against victims of
humanly caused disasters.
Although there were limitations to individual studies, we
aimed to rectify those in subsequent studies. For example,
while the crucial DV in Study 1 was a one-item measure, this
was a reliable multi-item measure in Study 2. Similarly, while
the DV in Study 2 was only self-reported behaviour intention,
Study 3 included a measure of actual donation behaviour. We
would argue that in conjunction, therefore, the present series of
studies presents a coherent and convincing argument in favour
of the hypothesised effects. Another limitation concerns the
potential generalizability of the findings. Although we would
argue that the observed effects will generalise to human and
natural disaster causes other than the ones studied here,
this cannot be asserted with certainty without further testing.
Likewise, although we have no reason to believe that the
present effects would not emerge in samples with different
demographics, again this could usefully be explored in further
research.
We believe that this research generates insights into how
charities and NGOs can target their relief appeals more
effectively for those causes that are by default unpopular and
to help those victims that would otherwise be forgotten.
In designing disaster relief appeals, it might be useful to try and
explicitly address and counteract people’s biases. For example,
for humanly caused disasters, appeals could explicitly stress
that even though an armed conflict is going on, the victims are
impartial civilians who did not trigger the fighting. Similarly,
appeals could stress that victims are making an effort to
help themselves. This last idea might be particularly helpful,
given that many appeals in the past have tended to portray
victims as lethargic and passive, presumably to underscore
their neediness. Our results suggest that such a portrayal might
actually be counterproductive.
Since very few previous attempts have been made to
research predictors of help for large groups in great need
and specifically donations following humanitarian disasters,
unsurprisingly many open questions remain. For example,
other potential predictors donations and psychological
mediators might be unearthed by future research (for more
research on related questions, see Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic,
Johnson, & Friedrich, 1997; Slovic, 2007). Further, disasters
other than the examples studied here exist, such as disasters
related to terrorist attacks or climate change. Future research
might usefully extend to such other types of disasters. Finally,
although our hypothesis has juxtapositioned events which are
perceived to have predominantly natural or human causes,
those categories could be further refined. For example, among
humanly caused events one might differentiate between events
Table 2. The effect of victim blame and self-help on donations, Study 4
Self-reported willingness to donate
Victim blame
High Low Marginals
Self-help High 4.17 (1.21) 4.84 (1.16) 4.51 (1.22)
Low 3.86 (1.11) 4.35 (0.89) 4.11 (1.03)




Self-help High 2.74 (2.50) 3.84 (2.29) 3.29 (2.45)
Low 2.85 (2.56) 3.06 (2.51) 2.96 (2.53)
Marginals 2.79 (2.52) 3.47 (2.42)
Note: SDs in parentheses.
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in which the cause is attributable to the victim group, or to
a group which is clearly distinct from the victim group, or to
a group which shares a superordinate category with the
victim group. The effects of such differential categorizations
on psychological reactions to disaster events could be studied
further. These and many other issues remain. We hope that
one contribution of the present research will be to highlight
donations to disaster victims as an interesting topic which
merits more attention in the future.
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